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Abstract 
This paper investigates the extent to which companies headquartered in Scotland 
were exposed to heightened political uncertainty in the run-up to, and after, the 
2014 independence referendum. Using a specially constructed capitalisation 
weighted stock price index for Scottish companies listed on the London stock 
exchange, evidence is presented to show that in the early part of the sample period, 
from April 2010 to late 2013, the conditional volatilities of the Scottish stock 
returns and of returns in the FTSE all share index can be characterised by the same 
GARCH parameters, but this is no longer the case once the estimation period is 
extended closer to the referendum date. Further investigation indicates that the 
relative volatility of Scottish companies’ stock returns peaked in early September 
2014, when the polls suggested the referendum result was too close to call, fell back 
after the referendum result was known, but built up again in the run up to the 
publication of the Smith Commission’s report on further devolution in November 
2014. These key findings are found to be robust to the inclusion/exclusion of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, the whole of the Scottish financial sector, and companies 
operating in the oil and gas sector from the Scottish stock price index.  
Keywords: Scottish independence referendum; stock market volatility; political 
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An interesting feature of referendums is that they are often motivated by the desire to 
resolve big debates, or to settle issues characterised by strong and divergent views, once 
and for all. Unlike countries such as Switzerland where referendums have been 
commonplace, in the UK they had been much less frequent. But two big referendum 
campaigns – the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the EU referendum in 
2016 – have had highly significant implications for the UK economy.   
One consequence of referendums can be a rise in uncertainty. This is especially 
likely when the economic and political stakes are high, as was the case during both the 
Scottish independence and EU referendums. The effects are also likely to be strongest 
when the outcome is uncertain, as again was the case in the run up to the Scottish 
independence and EU referendums (in both cases, opinion polls shortly before the vote 
put both sides within sight of victory).  In a world of 24 hour news coverage, it is also 
much more likely that every scrap of information, both credible and more speculative, is 
shared across a wider number of people. This too can lead to heightened uncertainty. 
This paper examines information from financial markets in the run up to, and 
immediately after, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.  To the best of our 
knowledge it is the first study to focus on stock market volatility around the time of the 
Scottish independence referendum.  More specifically, we construct a capitalisation 
weighted daily stock price index for Scottish companies listed on the London stock 
exchange, and model stock returns for this index as compared to returns for the FTSE 
all share index. We are able to show that for the early part of our sample period, from 
April 2010 to late 2013, the conditional volatilities of the Scottish stock returns and of 
returns in the FTSE all share index can be characterised by the same GARCH 
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parameters, but that this is no longer the case once estimation extends beyond mid 
December 2013.  Upon further investigation we show that that the relative stock market 
volatility of Scottish companies’ stock returns peaked in early September 2014, at a 
time when the polls suggested the referendum result was too close to call, fell back after 
the referendum result was known, but built up again in the run up to the publication of 
the Smith Commission’s report on further devolution in November 2014. We 
demonstrate that these findings are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of the Royal Bank 
of Scotland; to the exclusion of the whole of the Scottish financial sector; and to the 
exclusion of Scottish listed companies operating in the oil and gas sector.  
Note that this analysis does not constitute an attempt to assess whether or not 
Scottish independence would be good or bad for the economy. Instead it is designed to 
investigate the impact of the referendum itself on financial market volatility, to see 
whether or not the referendum added significantly and differentially to the volatility of 
stock returns of Scottish companies as compared to the FTSE as a whole; and to 
determine whether any differential impact diminished rapidly once the referendum 
result was revealed.  
Stock market volatility matters in part because it is likely to discourage new 
share issues and initial public offerings. The performance of companies’ shares also 
impacts on lenders’ risk assessments, meaning that higher volatility can result in an 
increase in the companies’ costs of borrowing. Recent research, see for example Bloom, 
Baker and Davis (2013),  has suggested that the kind of political uncertainty associated 
with elections and referendums can increase unemployment and reduce investment, but 
this will matter less if any period of heightened volatility is short lived. 
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It is interesting to note that since the 2014 referendum, the Scottish economy has 
grown much more slowly than the UK as a whole. Over the two years to the end of 
2016 for example, the UK economy grew by 3.6% while the Scottish economy grew by 
just 1.2%. A number of prominent business leaders and politicians have expressed fears 
that the uncertainties caused by 2014 referendum – and a possible future re-run – could, 
in part, be a reason for this much weaker performance.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 briefly discusses some 
key findings in related literature, which help to motivate our work; section 3 sets out a 
timeline of key events in the run up to, and in the aftermath of, the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum. In section 4 we explain how the publicly listed companies 
headquartered in Scotland were identified and describe the data used in this study. 
Section 5 outlines the econometric methodology employed. Section 6 presents the key 
results. A number of robustness checks are carried out in section 7 and section 8 
concludes. 
 
2.  Related literature 
There are very few empirical studies of the impact of referendums on stock market 
volatility. Nonetheless a number of studies have examined the behaviour of stock 
market volatility around the time of elections: these include Goodell and Vähämaa 
(2013) and Li and Born (2006) who focused on US presidential elections; Smales 
(2014) who looked at Australian elections; and Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski 
(2008) who looked at evidence for 27 OECD countries around the time of national 
elections. Each of these studies concluded that elections are accompanied by a 
significant hike in stock market volatility, and demonstrated that this heightened 
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volatility is more pronounced in closely contested races when polling suggests that no 
candidate has a dominant lead. They also point to a number of cases in which the 
excessive volatility could not be resolved quickly, for example when the political 
orientation of the government changes or when the election result was inconclusive. 
These empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Pástor and 
Veronesi (2012, 2014).   
Other aspects of political uncertainty have been studied by Siokis and 
Kapopoulos (2007) who provided evidence that political regime changes impacted on 
the conditional variance of the Athens stock market indices.  Alongside the multi-
country results presented by Bialkowski et al. (op. cit.), Vuchelen (2003) emphasised 
that election results tend to contain much less information about future policies in 
coalition-based political systems. Whilst election results may have some impact in 
reducing uncertainties by eliminating some possibilities, more decisive positions only 
become clear once a new coalition has been announced.  Using Belgian data he 
demonstrated that election outcomes are considered by investors with a time lag while 
the formation of a new coalition that tends to have the more significant impact on the 
stock prices at the Brussels Stock Exchange.  This kind of timing issue may be relevant 
after the Scottish referendum result too, particularly given that neither a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
vote was going to result in prolonging the status quo.  As is explained in section 3, a 
commitment had been given prior to the vote by the then leaders of the three main UK 
parties campaigning against Scottish independence, that further powers would be 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament should voters opt to remain within the UK. 
Arin, Molchanov and Reich (2013) examined the effects of a number of political 
variables on stock returns and their volatilities using Bayesian methods applied to a 
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panel dataset for 17 parliamentary democracies spanning the post-war period until 1995. 
They argued against focusing only on election years and found the empirical case for 
effects of political variables on stock return volatilities was considerably stronger than 
the case for effects of these variables on stock returns.   
Far fewer studies that have explored how political uncertainty influences 
financial markets outside of the election cycle. An exception, with some similarities to 
our own, is Beaulieu, Cosset and Essadam (2006). This paper focuses on the Quebec 
referendum in October 1995 which could have led to the separation of Quebec from the 
Canadian federation.  As in the Scottish case, opinion polls did not agree on a clear 
winning side, so uncertainty associated with the Quebec referendum could not be 
resolved prior to the vote. Even after the result, when 50.6% voted No, it was not clear 
that this had immediately resolved uncertainty with respect to Quebec’s future.  
The impact of the resolution of uncertainty has been investigated in several 
papers that look at the behaviour of asset price volatility around the time of scheduled 
information releases. The clear consensus of these empirical studies is that volatility in 
financial markets tends to: i) be significantly greater on announcement days than on 
other days; ii) remain significantly higher for several hours after the information 
release; and iii) dissipates rapidly as uncertainty is resolved; see for example, Smales 
(2013), Vähämaa and Äijö (2011), Chen and Clements (2007), Nikkinen and Sahlström 
(2004), and Donders and Vorst (1996) and Ederington and Lee (1996, 1993). 
The Beaulieu et al. (op. cit.) paper on the impact of the Quebec referendum 
provides a particularly helpful starting point for our own work. In particular, they 
sought to contrast the impact of the uncertainty surrounding the referendum outcome on 
the stock returns of 71 Quebec firms as compared to a sample of Canadian (apart from 
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Quebec) and U.S. firms.  Their choice of Quebec firms was based upon those 
headquartered in the province of Quebec and listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange 
and/or on the Toronto Stock Exchange at the time of the referendum.  They found that 
the uncertainty surrounding the referendum outcome had a significant, but ultimately 
short-term impact on the stock returns of Quebec firms. Furthermore, the reaction of 
financial markets to the referendum outcome was indicative of a resolution of 
uncertainty, which they found to be particularly important for domestic Quebec firms. 
 
3. The Scottish Independence Referendum Timeline 
The Scottish independence referendum took place on 18th September 2014.  The process 
toward that referendum began in earnest following the Scottish Nationalist Party’s 
victory in the Scottish Parliament election of 5th May 2011 which effectively gave the 
First Minister, Alex Salmond, the mandate to push forward with the party’s plans for 
the independence referendum. He quickly confirmed his intention to hold the 
referendum in the second half of the five year electoral term. Intentions were further 
firmed up on 10th January 2012, when the First Minister announced that the referendum 
would be held in the autumn of 2014. There followed a protracted period of negotiations 
between the UK and Scottish governments over the necessary constitutional 
arrangements. These negotiations culminated in the Edinburgh Agreement, signed on 
15th October 20121. The final wording of the referendum question was agreed on 30th 
January 2013 and the date of the referendum was announced on 21st March 2013.   
                                                 
1 The full text of the Edinburgh Agreement: Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and 
the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland, 15 October 2012, is available 
here: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0040/00404789.pdf.  
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In November 2013 the Scottish Government published ‘Scotland’s Future’ – 
their ‘blueprint for independence’2.  During February and March of 2014 the debate was 
dominated by the ‘currency question’.  On 16th June 2014, the Scottish Government 
published their white paper "Scottish Independence Bill: A consultation on an interim 
constitution for Scotland"3. Both campaigns were well underway when televised 
debates took place on the 5th and 25th of August.   
Initially information on voting intentions was captured relatively infrequently. 
There were just four opinion polls conducted by British Polling Council members 
published between May 2011 and the end of that year. Results of a further eight polls 
were published during 2012, of which half took place around the time of the Edinburgh 
Agreement. Unsurprisingly, polling intensity increased during 2013 with results of 23 
polls published in that year, and a total of 69 poll results published between 3rd January 
and 17th September 2014. Of these, 20 were conducted in the final month before the 
vote. During this final pre-referendum period, the gap between the proportions of those 
intending to vote Yes and No narrowed, as is evident in Figure 1.  
Of particular note was a YouGov poll conducted for the Sunday Times, 
published on 7th September 2014, which found that 51 per cent of voters in Scotland 
would back independence, compared with 49 per cent opposed (when undecided voters 
were excluded). This result marked a four point increase in support for a Yes vote in 
less than a week.  This was followed by a TNS poll made public on the night of 8th 
September which put the two campaigns neck and neck. 
                                                 
2 Scottish Government (2013) Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, 29th November, 
is available here: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf.  
3 Scottish Government (2014) Scottish Independence Bill: A consultation on an interim constitution for 




Figure 1. Poll results in the run up to the Scottish independence referendum 
 




Writing on 9th September 2014, Professor John Curtice – one of the UK’s most 
respected psephologists – expressed a common view:  
 
“As a result of today’s poll, our poll of polls… has been updated. On that 
measure Yes support has edged up again and now stands at 48%, with 
No on 52%. The referendum race is now clearly too close to call.” 
http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/09/tns-now-say-it-is-a-dead-heat/  
 
These polls resulted in a flurry of activity: George Osborne, the then Chancellor 
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of the Exchequer, announced on the morning of 7th September that a cross-party 
agreement on new powers for the Scottish Government in relation to taxation and 
welfare would be confirmed “within days”. This led to the ‘Vow’ being published, two 
days before the vote, where the then leaders of the three main UK parties campaigning 
against Scottish independence committed to “extensive new powers” for the Scottish 
Parliament should voters opt to remain within the UK, "delivered by the process and to 
the timetable agreed" by the three parties4.  
Ultimately, the vote took place on the 18th September 2014 and the final result 
was declared on the 19th September 2014. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
established the Smith Commission on the same day with the aim of delivering the 
‘Vow’. The Commission reported on 27th November 20145, making a number of 
recommendations in relation to further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament. 
Legislation based on these recommendations was implemented in the Scotland Act 
2016, which received Royal Assent on 23rd March 20166.  
During the referendum campaign, many Scottish companies were initially 
reluctant to make explicit statements either in favour or against Scottish independence 
for fear of alienating their shareholders, customers or workforce. However, as the vote 
approached, there was an increasing flurry of media stories around the consequences of 
independence. In addition, the UK Government’s campaign put economic uncertainty at 
                                                 
4 The vow, a letter signed by the three main UK party leaders, appeared on the front page of the Daily 
Record on 16th September 2014, see http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-ed-
miliband-nick-4265992.  
5 The Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament is 
available here: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171017/http://www.smith-
commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf. 
6 For further details see http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/scotland/documents.html . 
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the heart of much of its argument for Scotland remaining in the UK (UK Government, 
2014).  
A number of firms were required by corporate governance rules to inform their 
investors of their contingency plans in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote – including two of the 
country’s largest financial services companies Standard Life and Royal Bank of 
Scotland (see, for example, the discussion in the Financial Times, “Standard Life warns 
on Scots ‘Yes’ vote” published on 27th February 2014).   
The timeline of events set out above has informed the choice of sample period in 
this study. In order to capture key events in the run-up to the referendum date, the 
estimation period starts in April 2010. In order to examine whether any financial market 
impacts of uncertainty surrounding the referendum result were resolved after the results 
were announced, the post referendum sample extends to June 2015. We avoid extending 
the sample beyond this, e.g. to include the run up to the Brexit referendum, since we 
want to focus on the period in which Scotland could reasonably be seen to be 
experiencing uncertainty in a way that is distinctive to that facing the UK as a whole.  
 
4. Data 
The first step toward constructing a Scottish stock price index is to identify companies 
listed on the LSE that can be classified as ‘Scottish’ during the period under study. The 
key criteria applied are that selected companies had their headquarters in Scotland 
and/or that their major operations were located within Scotland, during part or all of the 
sample period investigated. A similar strategy is discussed in Marsh and Evans (2014) 
although they included Investment Trusts in their index, while we choose to exclude 
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them7.  From our perspective these types of firms have unique characteristics given 
their status as investment vehicles. In particular, they are typically run by a very small 
management team and have limited ‘footprint’ within the local economy.  Our decision 
to omit them reflects our desire to look at a purer measure of the impact of political 
uncertainty on Scottish companies.   
An alternative approach could be to look at all UK based listed companies’ 
exposure to the potential outcomes of the referendum, differentiating by whether they 
have any operations in Scotland or not, and by what proportion of their revenues are 
attributable to sales in Scotland, or perhaps what proportion of their total UK employees 
are located in Scotland. However this kind of information is simply not available. In any 
case, in our view it is important to note that uncertainty around independence wasn't just 
about how well Scotland would perform economically, it was also about fundamental 
legal and constitutional structures, economic rules and regulations, membership of the 
EU and applicability of global treaties etc.  Many of these factors would have a 
distinctive impact on companies headquartered in Scotland, not just how exposed they 
were to our market share. So, for example, two financial services companies with equal 
market share in Scotland faced a completely different set of risks if one was registered 
in London and the other in Edinburgh.   
Several sources of relevant information were consulted to inform this approach. 
                                                 
7  Marsh and Evans (op cit.) reported that 10 of the top 20 Scottish listed companies by market 
capitalisation at the start of 2014 were Investment Trusts. Investment Trusts were also the second largest 
sector represented in stock listings, by market capitalisation, "with an astonishing 26% weighting” while 
this sector has “…just a 3% weighting within the UK as a whole" p4. Based on the reference point of the 
August 2013 historical files from the London Stock Exchange, we disregarded prices of 39 shares that 
Marsh and Evans would have included: for 31 'Equity or Non-Equity Investment Instruments', 2 'Real 
Estate Holding and Development’ companies, 3 'Specialty Finance' companies and 3 'Debenture and 
Loan' companies. Other differences in the number of listed shares reflect exclusions we made following 




Up until August 2013, the London Stock Exchange’s historical files provide a ‘region’ 
indicator for each company. Also, each issue of Business Insider Magazine provides a 
list of ‘Scotland’s quoted companies’, along with some accompanying commentary on 
the biggest movers. Lists compiled from these sources were cross-checked against 
information from Companies House, including each candidate listed company’s Annual 
Reports. This allowed us to investigate any conflicts; to clarify where corporate 
headquarters are located; and to check that each company does indeed have major 
operations located in Scotland. Annual reports were also helpful in providing dates of 
relevant relocations, mergers, closures or de-listings.  
A total of 64 Scottish companies listed on the London stock exchange were 
identified for inclusion in the constructed Scottish stock market index for at least some 
part of our chosen sample period which extends from 6th April 2010 – 4th June 2015, i.e. 
one month before the UK General Election in 2010 until one month after the UK 
General Election in 2015.  Table 1 summarises information on the numbers of Scottish 
listed companies as well as the numbers of entrants and exits during each year of the 
sample. Within any one year of the sample there were at most 56 Scottish companies in 
the index.  
 
Table 1. Numbers of Scottish companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
End Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2014 2016 
        
Number of companies 56 56 51 48 48 45 40 
Entrants during the year 4 3 2 0 1 0 0 
Exits during the year 1 3 7 3 1 3 5 





From the above table it is clear that the number of Scottish listed companies has 
fallen over the last six years, and that no Scottish companies were newly listed on the 
LSE over the period since the referendum (the last being Exova Group, a leading 
provider of laboratory based testing and related advisory services, founded in 2008 and 
headquartered in Edinburgh, who were first listed on the LSE in April 2014).  There are 
no obvious common features among the eleven companies that are dropped from the list 
of Scottish listed companies between the date of the Scottish election in May 2011 and 
the Independence referendum in September 2014. Nor are there any obvious common 
features among the eight companies that have delisted from the LSE since the 
independence referendum8.  None of these companies made any mention of the 
referendum featuring in their decision making with respect to mergers, listing or 
delisting in the relevant years’ annual report. 
                                                 
8  Companies that were initially included in the construction of our Scottish stock price index but are 
dropped at some point after the Scottish election in May 2011 and prior to the referendum are: Forth 
Ports, acquired by London based Arcus Infrastructure Partners in June 2011; Croma Group, formerly a 
Dumfries based aerospace and defence company and Pinnacle Telecom Group plc both dropped after 
reverse takeovers saw them moving key operations and their HQs to locations outside of Scotland in 
March 2012 and by March 2014 respectively; Wolfson Microelectronics, de-listed in April 2014 
following acquisition by US based Cirrus logic; Lee Foods, delisted on the LSE in 2012 after a 
management buyout; Robert Wiseman Dairies plc, delisted after a takeover by Mueller in February 2012; 
3D Diagnostic Imaging ltd, dropped in October 2012 when the company was re-named and re-focused as 
an investment company; former oil and gas companies, Deo Petroleum, Dana Petroleum and Melrose 
Resources, delisted in August 2012 September 2012 and October 2012 respectively, after becoming a 
subsidiary of Parkmeed Group, a takeover, and merging with Dublin based Petroceltic International plc; 
Quayle Munro who moved their HQ to London in July 2012 and delisted from the LSE a year later before 
re-registering as a private investment company; Dundee based media company I-Design Group plc, 
delisted in May 2013 and re-registered as a private company; and finally Angel Biotechnology Holdings 
who went into administration February 2013 and were delisted in April 2013. Those that have been 
delisted since the referendum are: Optos, a leading medical technology company based in Fife, focusing 
on design, manufacture and marketing of ultra-widefield retinal imaging devices, acquired by Nikon in 
February 2015; Rangers International FC, whose shares were suspended from trading in March 2015; 
John Swan and Sons, an Edinburgh based livestock auctioneer acquired by Carlisle based H&H Group in 
October 2015; Interbulk Group PLC, a Glasgow based provider of intermodal logistics solutions to the 
chemical and mineral industries, now part of Netherlands based Den Hartogh Holding B.V.; Aberdeen 
based SeaEnergy PLC, delisted after entering administration in July 2016; Energy Assets Group, a fast 
growing independent supplier of metering services, analytics and utility network services, after acquistion 
by BidCo Limited in July 2016; Greenock based British Polythene Industries, acquired by 
Nothamptonshire based RPC Group in June 2016, and Stirling based Superglass Holdings, previously the 
UK’s biggest independent manufacturer of glass mineral and wool insulation, delisted in September 2016 
after agreeing to be acquired by a Cyprus based investment company. 
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Scottish companies are included in the Scottish stock price index from the start 
of the sample or, where relevant, from the date of listing, up until any date of relocation, 
merger – with parent company located outside of Scotland, or date of delisting from the 
London Stock Exchange. This approach contrasts with that used in Beaulieu et al. (op 
cit.) where Quebec based companies were included in their sample if they were 
identified as having been listed and headquartered in Quebec at the date of the 
referendum. In practice this would, for example, miss out any companies that made a 
strategic move to relocate their HQ prior to the referendum date, any companies making 
a new listing, or existing listed companies transferring their HQ to Quebec after the 
referendum.  Given the changes observed in the number of Scottish listed companies 
over our sample period, we believe it is particularly important to avoid any potential 
bias that could arise from focusing only on companies that were headquartered in 
Scotland on the date of the Independence referendum. 
Beaulieu et al. constructed a matched sample of Quebec and US/Canadian 
companies using capitalisation and other data as close to the date of the referendum as 
possible. We were keen to avoid the short-cut of fixing capitalisation weights 
throughout the sample period. Even a look at the variation in the market capitalisation 
of the top 10 Scottish listed companies at some key dates suggests this would be 
unwise, see Table 2 below. We therefore collected daily data on both market 
capitalisation and stock prices for each Scottish listed company from Datastream, and 
chose to construct a capitalisation weighted stock price index in which the capitalisation 
weights are updated each period, mimicking the construction of the FTSE indices as 





Table 2. Top 10 Scottish Listed Companies by Market Capitalisation 
31st December 2009 18th September 2014 20th October 2016 
RBS 31.8 RBS 30.0 RBS 33.2 
SSE 20.7 SSE 19.7 SSE 24.6 
Standard Life 9.4 Standard Life 13.2 Standard Life 10.0 
Cairn Energy 9.0 Aberdeen Asset Man’t 7.6 Aberdeen Asset Man’t 6.4 
Aggreko 4.9 Weir Group 7.5 Weir Group 5.8 
First Group 4.0 Aggreko 5.5 Wood Group 4.6 
Wood Group 3.2 Wood Group 3.7 Aggreko 3.3 
Weir Group 2.9 Stagecoach Group 2.8 First Group 1.9 
Aberdeen Asset Man’t 2.6 First Group 1.9 Cairn Energy 1.9 
Stagecoach Group 2.4 Cairn Energy 1.4 Stagecoach Group 1.7 
% of market cap 90.8  93.2  93.4 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
 
The presence of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in our sample raises some 
‘interesting’ issues. As is well known, RBS received a substantial bail-out during the 
depths of the financial crisis. Throughout our sample period the UK Government held 
81% of the company’s shares.  Given the peculiarities of this special case, our core 
sample excludes RBS shares from the construction of the Scottish share price index, 
nonetheless, at various points we also show results that do include RBS in the index.  
More generally the finance sector makes up a large, and growing, part of the 
Scottish stock price index than the FTSE over the sample period considered here. 
Another sector that has historically had strong representation among Scotland’s listed 
companies is the oil and gas sector. This sector has also been subjected to particular 
17 
 
challenges over the period we investigate – with the oil price falling from around $100 
per barrel in 2014 to half that by the end of 2015.  These considerations have motivated 
us to construct of a number of additional indicies which are used in several robustness 
checks discussed in Section 6.  For now we simply summarise market capitalisation by 
sector over each full calendar year from 2010 to 2015 in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Top 10 Scottish Listed Companies by Sector 
End year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
       
Financial Services 44.5 35.6 48.6 50.4 53.6 60.8 
Electricity 16.9 22.4 20.7 18.8 21.2 20.0 
Engineering +Technology 10.7 13.1 10.7 10.6 8.7 6.0 
Business support services 6.9 11.3 8.7 8.4 7.0 5.1 
Oil & Gas producers 12.1 8.7 4.0 3.6 2.1 1.6 
Travel & Leisure 5.4 6.3 4.8 5.5 4.9 4.1 
Food & Beverages 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 
Media 1.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 
Other 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 
Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Daily data were also collected for the FTSE all share index, which is used as a 
benchmark series to compare and contrast with the volatility of the Scottish indices.  
Focusing on comparing the volatility of stock returns based on alternative capitalisation 
weighted stock price indices with that of the FTSE all share index avoids us having to 
match each individual Scottish listed company with a ‘similar’ company located 
elsewhere in the UK. In our view, attempting this kind of matching would be both non-
trivial and, in many cases, controversial.  The FTSE all share index is chosen over the 
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FTSE100 or FTSE250 since there are relatively few of the Scottish companies 
represented in these alternative indices.  We discuss the suitability our choice of the 
FTSE all share index as the benchmark index further in Section 6.   
Summary statistics for the key series investigated over the full sample, i.e. all 
trading days from 6th April 2010 to 4th June 2015, are provided in Table 4.   
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Daily Percentage Change in Stock Price Indicies 
     
 
N=1304 




Scottish exc.  
RBS  
Scottish exc. 
finance sector  
 
Mean      0.023 0.023 0.040 0.029 
Std. deviation      0.957 1.322 1.034 1.012 
Skewness     -0.132 -0.033 -0.236  -0.260 
Kurtosis      5.490 5.666 4.992 5.379 
Maximum      5.154 8.440 4.506  4.293   
Minimum     -4.490 -6.995 -5.488            -5.767 
     
Shapiro–Francia 
test (H0: normality) 
     7.697 [.00]             7.142 [.00]             6.816 [.00]            7.155 [.00] 
     
Skewness t-test     -1.948 [.05]            -0.481 [.63]           -3.437  [.00]           -3.842 [.00] 
Ex.Kurtosis t-test      18.35 [.00]             19.65 [.00]            17.54  [.00]            17.54 [.00] 
ARCH 1    χ2(1)          39.98 [.00]             48.58 [.00]            35.31 [.00]            40.39 [.00] 
ARCH 5    χ2(5)        148  [.00]               131  [.00]              126  [.00]              131  [.00] 
ARCH 10  χ2(10)        171  [.00]               167  [.00]              170  [.00]              197  [.00] 
Probability values for the various tests are shown in [.]. 
 
 
On the basis of the Shapiro-Francia test, the null hypothesis that the respective stock 
returns series are normally distributed is rejected conclusively in each case, this is not 
unexpected.  Skewness that is significantly different from 0 and kurtosis different from 
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3 signifies non-normality. The appropriate t-tests of H0 : skewness = 0 and H0 : no 
excess kurtosis are reported and the results are consistent with excess kurtosis in every 
case, with significant skewness in most, but not all, cases.  Furthermore, normal 
quantile plots of all three series are suggestive of symmetric distributions with fat tails; 
i.e. extreme positive and negative values of returns occur more frequently in the data 
than would be consistent with the normal distribution. The final three tests reported in 
Table 4 provide evidence of significant autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in 
each series, which is supportive of the need for the GARCH modelling strategy adopted 
in this paper. 
 
5. Econometric Methodology 
 
Our key objective is to examine the extent to which listed companies headquartered in 
Scotland were exposed to heightened political uncertainty in the run-up to, and after, the 
2014 independence referendum. To achieve this objective, having constructed the stock 
price indicies described in the previous section, and after calculating daily returns, i.e. 
the percentage change in each stock price index, a set of bivariate and univariate 
GARCH models are estimated to both capture and compare the conditional volatility of 
stock returns as represented by the Scottish stock price index on the one hand and the 
FTSE all share index on the other.  
Specifically, having demonstrated that the stock returns series exhibit significant 
volatility clustering on the basis of the ARCH effects identified in Table 4 above,  we 
estimate a bivariate GARCH model which provides time-varying estimates of the 
conditional covariance matrix for Scottish and FTSE all share stock returns.  A number 
of multivariate GARCH specifications are available, all of which allow the conditional 
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variances and covariance of the stock returns to depend on their own past history.  
Following Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), we choose to use the relatively 
parsimonious diagonal VECH representation which assumes that the conditional 
covariance matrix is diagonal, implying that each variance and covariance depends only 
on its own past history.  In the bivariate DVECH GARCH(1,1) model the conditional 
variances and covariances are specified as follows: 
2   2 2
11t 1,t  11 11 1,t 1 11 1,t 1
12t 1,t 2,t 12 12 1,t 1 2,t 1 12 1,t 1 2,t 1
2   2 2
22t 2,t  22 22 2,t 1 22 2,t 1
h     
h
h     = 
− −
− − − −
− −
= σ = ϖ + α ε + β σ
= σ σ = ϖ + α ε ε + β σ σ
= σ ϖ + α ε + β σ
     
 
The model also incorporates mean equations for the two stock return series.  We 
shall investigate whether lags of each of the returns series play any significant role in 
the two mean equations, either individually or jointly. Our expectation is that they will 
not, in line with the common finding that stock returns are unpredictable, while we 
expect to be able to capture systematic elements of conditional volatility in the 
equations set out above.  
Under the assumption of conditional normality the system of equations that 
characterise the DVECH GARCH(1,1) model can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The standard GARCH coefficients, { }11 11 22 22   α β α β  capture how lagged shocks and 
conditional volatilities impact on the current conditional volatilities.  The coefficient
12α , attached to the past product term 1,t 1 2,t 1− −ε ε ,  captures co-movements across 
markets, while the coefficient 12β  on the term 1,t 1 2,t 1− −σ σ  captures the persistence of 
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covariance. Likelihood ratio tests will be applied to test the null hypothesis of a constant 
conditional covariance matrix i.e. to check whether it is data admissible for the 
parameters { }11 11 12 12 22 22     α β α β α β  to be jointly restricted to 0.   
Within this bivariate set-up, we are also able to test the null hypothesis that the 
conditional volatilities of the two series can characterised by the same GARCH process, 
that is 11 22=  α α and 11 22= β β .   If this null hypothesis is data admissible, at least over 
some part of the sample period that we examine, this provides some justification for 
using the  FTSE all share index as a reasonable benchmark against which to compare 
volatilities Scottish companies’ stock returns. In the results presented in Section 6 we 
first look at the full sample period and find that the null hypothesis is rejected, but then 
find that if estimation is ended in October 2012, at the point that the Edinburgh 
Agreement was signed, this null hypothesis of equality of the GARCH parameters 
cannot be rejected. Then by successively rolling forward the end date of the sample 
used in estimation we are able to investigate at what point in time there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the parameterisation of the volatility of Scottish stock returns 
differs from that of returns on the FTSE all share index. Nonetheless, results from this 
kind of sequential testing should be seen as relatively informal, and indicative, since 
tests of this kind are not statistically independent, with the consequence that the true 
size of the tests is likely to be distorted. 
 One disadvantage of bivariate GARCH modelling is the imposition of symmetry 
in the effects of positive and negative shocks.  We therefore move on to separate 
univariate modelling of the conditional volatility of the two stock returns series, 
exploiting the greater flexibility this allows. Both exponential (EGARCH) and threshold 
(TGARCH) models, proposed by Nelson (1991) and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 
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(1993) respectively, are shown to be more appropriate than the simple GARCH model 
for our data. Again this is not unexpected. Both these specifications allow for 
asymmetric effects of shocks on volatility, in the sense that ‘bad news’ in the form of a 
drop in the share price index tends to be followed by higher volatility than ‘good news’ 
i.e. a rise in the index of the same magnitude.  The precise specifications of the 
conditional volatility equations in each of these cases is are shown below: 
 
  
2   2 2
t t  t 1 t 1
2 t 1t 1
t t 1
t 1 t 1
2 2 2 2
t t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
GARCH(1,1) :             h
EGARCH(1,1) :          lnh ln
TGARCH(1,1) :          h d






− − − −
= σ = ϖ + αε + βσ
εε
= ϖ + β σ + γ + α
σ σ
= σ = ϖ + αε + γ ε + βσ
t 1 t 1 d 1 if 0,  and 0 otherwise.
+
− −= ε > =
 
 
Another issue to be confronted in the univariate modelling is the choice of 
distribution assumed in estimation. This choice is fundamental to obtaining efficient 
parameter estimates and to admitting the extreme errors that financial markets 
sometimes produce. The initial examination of our data, as summarised in Table 4, 
indicated that the returns series are far from normally distributed: each of the key stock 
returns display significant skewness and excess kurtosis. Weiss (1986) and Bollerslev 
and Wooldridge (1992) have demonstrated that even when normality is inappropriately 
assumed, maximising the Gaussian log-likelihood results in quasi maximum likelihood 
estimation that is both consistent and asymptotically normally distributed but 
inefficient, provided that the conditional mean and variance of the model are correctly 
specified. Whilst the calculation of Woolridge’s robust standard errors is feasible, if the 
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standardised residuals follow a skewed distribution then Engle and Gonzalez-Rivera 
(1991) and Bollerslev and Wooldridge (op cit.) have shown that quasi maximum 
likelihood estimation can be problematic. To properly model the fat tails and asymmetry 
implied by excess kurtosis and skewness, it is likely to be necessary to fit the models 
under the assumption of an appropriate non-normal distribution. Two alternative 
distributional assumptions are available, both of which are likely to work better with fat 
tailed distributions: Student’s t; and the generalised error distribution (GED).   
Following estimation under the assumption of the Student’s t distribution the 
estimation of an additional parameter provides information about the thickness of the 
tails of the distribution. The Student’s t distribution approaches normal when this 
parameter is greater than 30, while a significantly lower parameter indicates thicker 
tails.  Estimation of the models under the assumption that the error variance follows a 
standardised GED adds estimation of a shape parameter that controls the fatness of the 
tails. When this shape parameter is 2 the tails are well represented by the normal 
distribution. A shape parameter that is significantly larger or smaller than 2 is indicative 
of fatter tails. 
After estimating GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models under each of the 
available distributional assumptions,  a preferred specification can be chosen in line 
with standard practice on the basis of:  i) the significance of the estimated parameters; 
ii) the diagnostic tests based upon the properties of the standardised residuals; and iii) 
minimising the relevant information criterion.   
Having chosen the preferred specifications for each of the key returns series, the 
time series for the estimated conditional variances from the separately estimated 
univariate models are examined. At this point we can seek evidence of any widening 
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divergence in the conditional volatility of stock returns of the Scottish companies 
relative to that of the UK benchmark series. By identifying the time periods in which 
any major divergences occur and checking to see if these periods are associated with the 
timing of key events associated with the timeline of the independence referendum as set 
out in section 2, then by checking whether any divergence persists or is resolved as 
further time passes, we are able to explore the whether there is evidence of clear 




6.1 Bivariate GARCH results 
The first set of results, shown in column 1 of Table 5, are the DVECH GARCH 
estimates that jointly model the mean, variances and covariance of the Scottish stock 
returns, excluding RBS, and returns in the FTSE all share index over the full sample 
period.  The mean equations in each case involve an intercept term and the first lags of 
each of the returns series in each equation, so stock returns are modelled using a VAR 
of order 1.  Whilst the lagged terms in the mean equations do not appear to be 
significant individually they are jointly significant as indicated in the first of the 
likelihood ratio tests provided in the table; on this basis they are retained (although it is 
worth pointing out the same inference with respect to the other parameters of the model 
holds, whether the mean equations contain a lag of each returns series or just an 
intercept term). The second likelihood ratio test reported in each column indicates that 
the null hypothesis of constant variances and covariance is strongly rejected in every 
case, so supports modelling the time varying conditional variances and covariances. 
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Table 5. Bivariate DVECH GARCH estimates 
   
 Full Sample: 6/4/10-4/6/15 Sub-Sample: 6/4/10-15/10/12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean equations 
µ1 0.061 (0.025) [.01] 0.064 (0.025) [.01] 0.084 (0.041) [.04] 0.084 (0.040) [.04] 
µ2 0.042 (0.022) [.06] 0.045 (0.022) [.04] 0.033 (0.039) [.41] 0.034 (0.039) [.39] 
µ11 -0.025 (0.053) [.64] -0.022 (0.053) [.68] -0.039 (0.088) [.66] -0.039 (0.088) [.66] 
µ12 0.053 (0.058) [.36] 0.053 (0.058) [.36] 0.079 (0.090) [.38] 0.083 (0.090) [.36] 
µ21 0.043 (0.047) [.36] 0.046 (0.046) [.32] 0.098 (0.083) [.24] 0.097 (0.084) [.25] 
µ22 -0.049 (0.053) [.35] -0.050 (0.053) [.35] -0.095 (0.087) [.27] -0.089 (0.087) [.30] 
Variance and Covariance equations 
11ϖ  0.059 (0.015) [.00] 0.054 (0.019) [.01] 0.050 (0.019) [.01] 0.045 (0.018) [.01] 
12ϖ  0.031 (0.008) [.00] 0.039 (0.014) [.01] 0.033 (0.012) [.01] 0.037 (0.015) [.01] 
22ϖ  0.026 (0.008) [.00] 0.042 (0.015) [.01] 0.031 (0.013) [.02] 0.042 (0.017) [.01] 
α11 0.066 (0.012) [.00] 0.074 (0.016) [.00] 0.050 (0.011) [.00] 0.052 (0.012) [.00] 
α12 0.056 (0.011) [.00] 0.069 (0.015) [.00] 0.046 (0.010) [.00] 0.049 (0.011) [.00] 
α22 0.056 (0.012) [.00] 0.074 (0.016) [.00] 0.050 (0.012) [.00] 0.052 (0.012) [.00] 
β11 0.871 (0.025) [.00] 0.868 (0.034) [.00] 0.908 (0.022) [.00] 0.909 (0.022) [.00] 
β12 0.899 (0.019) [.00] 0.874 (0.032) [.00] 0.921 (0.017) [.00] 0.913 (0.021) [.00] 
β22 0.908 (0.020) [.00] 0.868 (0.034) [.00] 0.922 (0.019) [.00] 0.909 (0.022) [.00] 
 
LR test -  dropping lagged terms in the mean equations - H0: µ11 = µ12 = µ21 = µ22 = 0 
 χ2(4)=12.00 [.02]  χ2(4)=18.08 [.00]  
LR test -  constant variances and covariances - H0: α11 = α 12 = α  22 = β11 = β12 = β22 =0 
 χ2(6)=250 [.00]  χ2(6)=94.16 [.00]  
LR test - same parameters in GARCH processes -  H0: α11 =  α  22  and  β11 = β22. 
                                           χ2(2)= 8.29 [.02]                                              χ2(2)=2.86 [.24] 
 
Notes:  
1. Estimation is by maximum likelihood and was conducted using Stata 14.  
2. Series 1 is the Scottish index, excluding RBS; series 2 is the FTSE all share index.  
3. Standard errors are given in (.) and probability values are provided in [.]. 







Columns (1) and (2) report the unrestricted and restricted estimates of the model 
using the full sample period, where the restricted model constrains the ARCH and 
GARCH parameters to be the same for both series. The null hypothesis that the two 
returns series are characterised by the same ARCH and GARCH parameters is strongly 
rejected over the full sample, 6th April 2011 – 4th June 2015, as indicated in the 
likelihood ratio test at the foot of column (2) of Table 5, and its respective p-value of 
0.02. However, this result is overturned if estimation is ended in October 2012, at the 
point that the Edinburgh Agreement, which agreed the legislation necessary for the 
independence referendum, was signed. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 show the 
unrestricted and restricted estimates of the model when the sample ends on 15th 
October 2012. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the two returns series are 
characterised by the same GARCH process using this shorter estimation period, as 
indicated in the second likelihood ratio test shown at the foot of column (4). We appeal 
to this finding to justify our use of the FTSE all share index as a benchmark against 
which to compare the volatility of Scottish stock returns. 
Our next step is to repeat the estimation of the unrestricted and restricted  DVECH 
GARCH models and construct the equivalent likelihood ratio tests for a number of 
different sample periods. The objective is to investigate at what point in time there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the parameterisation of the volatility of Scottish stock 
returns begins to differ significantly from that of returns on the FTSE all share index. As 
explained in Section 5, the results obtained from this investigation should be seen only as 







Table 6. LR tests of the null hypothesis that the conditional volatilities of the two 
series are characterised by the same GARCH parameters – the effect 
of rolling forward the sample end date 
    
 
   
Sample end date Event LR test [p-value] 
15th October 2012 Edinburgh Agreement 2.86    [.239] 
30th January 2013 Referendum Question set 2.52    [.283] 
21st March 2013 Date of Referendum announced 3.50    [.174] 
26th November 2013 ‘Blueprint for Independence’ 5.74    [.057] 
1st July 2014 Scottish Independence Bill  9.16    [.010] 
18th September 2014 Referendum   9.34    [.009] 
 
Sample end date 
 
Number of months prior  
to the referendum 
    
        LR-test [p-value] 
    
18th March 2013 18 3.32 [0.190] 
18th April 2013 17 3.92 [0.141] 
17th May 2013 16 4.60 [0.100] 
18th June 2013 15 5.61 [0.061] 
18th July 2013 14 6.61 [0.037] 
16th August 2013 13 5.29 [0.071] 
18th September 2013 12 5.63 [0.060] 
18th October 2013 11 5.94 [0.051] 
18th November 2013 10 5.71 [0.058] 
18th December 2013 9 6.34 [0.042] 
17th January 2014 8 6.85 [0.033] 
18th February 2014 7 5.74 [0.057] 
18th March 2014 6 5.36 [0.069] 
17th April 2014 5 7.67 [0.022] 
16th May 2014 4 8.73 [0.013] 
18th June 2014 3 8.79 [0.012] 
18th July 2014 2 8.23 [0.016] 
18th August 2014 1 8.90 [0.012] 





The results presented in the top panel of Table 6 indicate that by the time of the 
publication of the ‘Blueprint for Independence’ in November 2014, the volatility of 
Scottish stock returns had already begun to deviate from that of the volatility of the FTSE 
all share index, the LR test indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of the GARCH 
parameters is rejected at the 10% level of significance. The rejection of the null is 
stronger, at the 1% level of significance when estimation extends through to the 
publication of the Scottish Independence Bill in July 2014. The lower panel of Table 6 
repeats the same testing but this time stopping the estimation period to 18 months before 
the referendum date, then extending the end date at monthly intervals through to 1 month 
before the vote (the end date is chosen to be the 18th of each month, or the last trading 
day prior to this date). While inference cannot be entirely precise, it is notable that the 
null hypothesis that the same GARCH parameters can adequately describe the volatility 
of returns on the FTSE all share index and the volatility of Scottish returns is rejected at 
the 10% level of significance, or less,  for estimation periods that end on 18th June 2013 
onwards, that is 15 months prior to the date of the referendum, onwards; and the relevant 
probability values are strictly decreasing over the last 5 months prior to the referendum. 
 
6.2  Univariate GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models 
 
As explained in Section 5, there are some disadvantages of multivariate GARCH 
models. In practice, univariate models can be more flexible and are likely to be better 
able to capture some aspects of the data.  Tables 7a, 7b and 7c report the results of 
estimating GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models under different distributional 
assumptions for FTSE all share index stock returns; the Scottish stock returns index; 
and the Scottish index that excludes RBS. In every case the full sample period, 6th April 
2011 – 4th June 2015 is used. 
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Table 7a. Modelling FTSE Stock Returns 
 
FTSE    GARCH   EGARCH   TGARCH 
N=1305 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mean Equation:   
µ 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.003 0.020 0.017 0.010 0.023 0.022 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.02) (0.023) (0.02) (0.02) (0.023) (0.02) (0.02) 
 [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.91] [0.33] [0.41] [0.67] [0.27] [0.29] 
Conditional Volatility Equation: 
ϖ  0.030 0.023 0.026 -0.010 -0.013 -0.012 0.031 0.032 0.031 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [.07] [.01] [.01] [.26] [.07] [.07] [.03] [.00] [.00] 
α 0.112 0.108 0.107 0.161 0.153 0.158 0.194 0.227 0.208 
 (0.042) (0.022) (0.023) (0.045) (0.033) (0.036) (0.079) (0.039) (0.036) 
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
β 0.855 0.870 0.865 0.954 0.957 0.955 0.881 0.870 0.874 
 (0.054) (0.025) (0.027) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.054) (0.022) (0.022) 
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
γ    -0.155 -0.189 -0.168 -0.219 -0.264 -0.237 
    (0.039) (0.023) (0.020) (0.076) (0.039) (0.034) 
    [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
Diagnostic testing: 
Distribution  2.389 0.503  2.606 0.538  2.57 0.532 
  (0.385) (0.055)  (0.448) (0.056)  (0.449) (0.056) 

























































































































AIC 3333.75 3308.53 3299.97 3261.86 3238.40 3240.12 3258.31 3237.72 3237.45 
SBIC 3354.44 3334.40 3325.83 3287.72 3269.44 3271.16 3284.17 3268.76 3268.49 
Notes:  
1. Estimation is by maximum likelihood and was conducted using Stata 14.  
2. Standard errors are given in (.) and probability values are provided in [.]. 
3. The ‘Distribution’ row in the diagnostic tests presents results relevant to the specific estimates 
which are discussed in the main text. 
4. Minimised information criteria are shown in bold.  
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Table 7b. Modelling Scottish Stock Returns 
 
SC_ALL   GARCH   EGARCH   TGARCH 
N=1305 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mean Equation: 
µ 0.048 0.044 0.047 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.018 
 (0.032) (0.03) (0.03) (0.031) (0.03) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
 [.13] [.15] [.12] [.86] [.75] [.71] [.70] [.59] [.56] 
          
 Conditional Volatility Equation: 
 ϖ  0.028 0.023 0.026 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.02 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [.04] [.04] [.03] [.15] [.12] [.10] [.05] [.01] [.01] 
          
α 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.081 0.083 0.082 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
β 0.920 0.925 0.923 0.985 0.987 0.986 0.944 0.944 0.944 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
γ    -0.066 -0.068 -0.067 -0.079 -0.082 -0.081 
    (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
    [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
Diagnostic tests:  
Distribution  1.724 0.353  1.949 0.418  1.966 0.423 
  (0.354) (0.061)  (0.334) (0.061)  (0.362) (0.061) 
  [.00] [.00]  [.00] [.00]  [.00] [.00] 





















          









































          






























































          
AIC 4190.43 4192.03 4177.24 4170.24 4171.64 4178.77 4171.36 4172.54 4201.67 
SBIC 4216.30 4217.90 4203.10 4201.28 4202.68 4204.64 4202.40 4203.58 4222.37 
  Notes:  see Table 7a. 




Table 7c. Modelling Scottish (exc. RBS) Stock Returns  
 
SC_XRBS   GARCH   EGARCH   TGARCH 
N=1305 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mean Equation: 
µ 0.055 0.061 0.058 0.015 0.027 0.025 0.018 0.030 0.028 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
 [.03] [.01] [.02] [.68] [.28] [.31] [.48] [.23] [.26] 
          
 Conditional Volatility Equation: 
 ϖ  0.032 0.031 0.032 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.041 0.039 0.041 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) (0.01) (0.011) 
 [.04] [.01] [.01] [.99] [.72] [.72] [.02] [.00] [.00] 
          
α 0.075 0.077 0.076 0.102 0.108 0.105 0.139 0.148 0.143 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.04) (0.028) (0.028) 
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
β 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.970 0.970 0.969 0.901 0.899 0.899 
 (0.035) (0.025) (0.025) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022) 
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
γ    -0.121 -0.134 -0.127 -0.163 -0.174 -0.168 
    (0.026) (0.02) (0.020) (0.045) (0.032) (0.031) 
    [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
          
Diagnostic tests:  
Distribution  2.132 0.452  2.366 0.500  2.57 0.498 
  (0.388) (0.059)  (0.414) (0.059)  (0.423) (0.059) 
  [.00] [.00]  [.00] [.00]  [.00] [.00] 





















          









































          






























































          
AIC 3619.86 3604.55 3603.54 3574.25 3563.83 3564.89 3577.81 3567.34 3568.06 
SBIC 3640.56 3630.42 3629.41 3600.11 3594.87 3595.93 3603.67 3598.38 3599.10 
  Notes:  see Table 7a. 
 
          







Columns (1) to (3) in each table report the results of GARCH estimation under 
three different distributional assumptions. Estimation in column (1) assumes asymptotic 
normality. Estimation is by quasi-maximum likelihood, with Wooldridge’s robust 
standard errors. Column (2) provides estimates under the assumption of Student’s t-
distribution. Column (3) reports the estimation results under the assumption that the 
error variance follows a GED. Columns (4) to (6) report estimates of the EGARCH 
model and columns (7) to (9) report the TGARCH estimates, again under each of the 
three distributional assumptions.   
Throughout these univariate results the mean equations consist only of an 
intercept term. The addition of the first lag of the stock returns was statistically 
insignificant in every case – this is consistent with the usual result that the level of stock 
returns is not predictable from its own past history. In columns (2), (5) and (9), the 
result reported in the ‘Distribution’ row in the diagnostic tests section of the table and 
provides information relating to the thickness of the tails of the distribution. The 
significance of this parameter indicates fatter tails than the normal distribution would 
predict. In columns (3), (6) and (9) the shape parameter from the GED estimates is 
reported is recorded in the ‘Distribution’ row of the diagnostic tests section of the table. 
The fact that this parameter is always significantly below 2 across all the GED estimates 
is also indicative of fat tails.  Provided that the GARCH models are correctly specified, 
all three estimators are consistent, but given the presence of fat tails, we expect the 
estimates that assume the Student’s t-distribution or alternatively the GED should work 
better and be more efficient. In practice, and as expected, the estimates of each of the 
parameters are very similar for a given GARCH, EGARCH or TGARCH specification, 
but the standard errors are typically lower for the estimates that assume a Student’s t-
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distribution or the GED than the robust standard errors obtained for the quasi maximum 
likelihood estimates. 
In every case, the key estimated parameters in the conditional volatility 
equations {α, β, γ} are always significantly different from zero, as indicated in the very 
low p-values recorded in the tables. This suggests that the systematic behaviour of the 
conditional volatility of stock returns is captured well by the models; only the intercept 
term in the conditional volatility equations, ϖ , often fails to reach significance.  The 
diagnostic tests, conducted using the standardised residuals, indicate that the null 
hypothesis of normally distributed disturbances is always rejected, echoing the message 
that the robust standard errors and/or the assumption of non-normal error distributions is 
appropriate. In most cases the standardised residuals exhibit both skewness and excess 
kurtosis, the only exceptions are the GARCH and EGARCH models of Scottish stock 
returns (columns (1) to (6) of Table 7b), for which no significance skewness is detected.  
The report ARCH tests convey a more positive message, indicating that the modelling 
of conditional volatility is sufficient to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no remaining 
autoregressive heteroskedasicity of order 1, up to order 5 or up to order 10 in the 
(squared) standardised residuals. 
The significance of the asymmetric terms in the EGARCH and TGARCH 
models implies that either of these specifications is preferable to the pure GARCH 
model and the parameter estimates are consistent with the interpretation that negative 
shocks have a greater impact on conditional volatility than positive shocks of the same 
magnitude.  Further discrimination between the models is feasible through use of the 
information criteria. The AIC and SBIC are both minimised when the GED estimates of 
the TGARCH model is chosen, in column (9) of Table 7a for the FTSE returns. This 
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achieves a marginal improvement on the EGARCH estimates that assume the t-
distribution shown in column (5); the quasi maximum likelihood estimates of the 
EGARCH model with robust standard errors achieve minimum AIC and SBIC in the 
case of the Scottish stock returns series, i.e. column (4) of Table 7b; and in the case of 
the Scottish series excluding RBS in Table 7c, the EGARCH model estimates that 
assume the t-distibution in column (5). 
Having chosen a set of preferred models, we now go on to examine the 
estimated conditional volatilities of stock returns for the FTSE all share index and the 
Scottish indices respectively.  Figure 2a plots the estimated conditional volatilities 
derived from the preferred models reported in Tables 7a and 7b over the full sample 
period.  
 
Figure 2a: Estimated Conditional Volatilities of Stock Returns 



























































































Looking at the volatility of the series as a whole, we find that the two series tend 
to be highly correlated with each other. This is unsurprising. Most listed companies 
operate in global markets and are impacted by the same issues – e.g. swings in stock 
market sentiment in Wall Street. Similarly, given the close linkages between the 
Scottish and rUK economies, the economic outlook for the UK will be highly correlated 
with the economic outlook for Scotland. We also find however, that the Scottish series 
tends to be slightly more volatile: the blue line (showing volatility in the Scottish series) 
lies above the red line (showing volatility in the FTSE). The date of the independence 
referendum is indicated on the graph with a red vertical line and text label. It’s clear that 
the absolute level of volatility was actually relatively low at this point in time in 
comparison to some other periods within the sample period. For example, the volatility 
associated with the European debt crisis of 2011 can be clearly identified in the chart as 
can the political uncertainty following the result of the UK general election in 2010 – 
the UK first election to end in a hung parliament for 36 years - which eventually led to 
the formation of the Conservative led coalition, see Cawood (2013). 
The above results are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of RBS.  As 
mentioned previously, there are special factors to take into consideration. RBS shares 
prices have a big impact on the Scottish series firstly given its sheer scale (the share 
price series attracts large market capitalization weights). There are also well known 
factors that affect changes in the RBS share price at various points in our sample period, 
not least reflecting regular debates about whether the government would or would not 
begin to sell some of its 85% stake in the bank. For these reasons our preferred Scottish 
index, which can allow us to focus more clearly on the impacts of the independence 
referendum on Scottish stock market volatility, is the series that excludes RBS (and this 
was the series used exclusively in the bi-variate models reported in section 6.1). 
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Figure 2b compares the FTSE series with the estimated conditional volatility 
from the preferred model of stock returns in the Scottish index that excludes the RBS, 
again over the full sample period. Some interesting features are now noticeable. Firstly, 
the estimated volatilities are now broadly the same for the first part of the sample (i.e. 
the blue and red lines are very close to each other). This adds to the evidence of the 
similarity of the volatility processes presented in section 6.   
 
 
Figure 2b: Estimated Conditional Volatilities of Stock Returns 




However, in common with earlier results reported in Table 6, the conditional 























































































with the Scottish series tending to be more volatile than the FTSE. This can be seen 
more clearly in Figure 3a, which zooms in on the period from June to December of 
2014, a period spanning 3 months prior to the Independence referendum and 3 months 
after.  Figure 3b plots a relative measure of estimated volatility, calculated as the 
percentage deviation in the Scottish series from the FTSE series: a positive number here 
means that the estimated level of volatility is higher in the Scottish series whilst a 
negative number indicates that volatility in higher for the FTSE series.  
Figure 3b shows that there was a rise in the estimated volatility of the Scottish 
series relative to the FTSE series in the immediate run up to the date of the 
independence referendum. In particular there is a very clear jump up in the volatility of 
the Scottish series when trading reacted to the YouGov poll published in the Sunday 
Times on 7th September that put the Yes campaign in the lead.  Heightened volatility 
then continued until polling day, but receded immediately after the referendum result 
was known. It is also clear from charts 3a and 3b that the referendum did not signal the 
end of the story.  There is further evidence of heightened relative volatility while the 
Smith Commission process was ongoing, and a peak on the date of publication of the 




                                                 
9   There is also a clear spike in FTSE volatility, and decline in the relative volatility of the Scottish series 
on 15th October 2014 – this reflected the large one day sell-off in major stock markets. At the time this 
was widely attributed to worries about global growth after the release of weak economic data and to fears 
that the Federal Reserve would soon seek to normalise monetary policy, ending its QE bond-buying 
programme and potentially raising interest rates.  
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Figure 3a:  Conditional Volatilities of Stock Returns 
Scottish index excluding RBS and FTSE all share index June to December 2014 
 
Figure 3b:  Relative Conditional Volatilities of Stock Returns 

























































































































7. Robustness Checks 
In this section we check the robustness of the key findings set out above.  As explained 
in section 4, the finance sector makes up a large, and growing, part of the capitalisation 
weighted Scottish stock price index over the sample period examined here.  In order to 
examine whether our key results reflect volatility in this sector or are spread more 
widely across Scottish shares, we construct a Scottish index that excludes the share 
prices of all the Scottish listed companies operating in the finance sector.   
In addition, we have previously noted that the oil and gas sector has historically 
had a strong presence among Scotland’s listed companies and has also been subjected to 
particular challenges over the sample period. In order to check whether the volatility 
experienced in this sector is affecting the overall results we construct another index that 
excludes oil and gas companies from our main Scottish index.  The effects of running 
the analysis on these indicies are summarised in Figure 4.   
Our final check is based on an index that removes the three largest Scottish 
listed companies by share capitalisation i.e. the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Scottish 
and Southern Electricity (SSE) and Standard Life.  As indicated in Table 2, at the time 
of the independence referendum these three companies accounted for over 60% of total 
market capitalisation. Constructing a new index that excludes these companies allows 
us to check whether the key characteristics in the movements in estimated volatility 
identified above are dominated by movements in the share prices of the largest 





Figure 4:  Relative Conditional Volatilities of Stock Returns 
Scottish indices and FTSE all share index, June to December 2014 
 
 
Figure 5:  Relative Conditional Volatilities of Stock Returns 
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The exclusion of the SSE and Standard Life along with RBS clearly does have 
an impact on the results.  The jump that followed the publication of the YouGov poll on 
7th September 2014 is now less evident, instead there was a steadier climb in relative 
volatility as the referendum date approached. Also, the post referendum decline in 
relative volatility it is not as pronounced and, aside from the October downward spike 
mentioned earlier, the relative volatility of the smaller Scottish listed companies is 
estimated to have reached a local peak on the publication of the Smith Commission 
report, with a lesser decline thereafter.  Suffice to say that we have provided some 
tentative evidence that smaller listed Scottish companies may have been more severely 
impacted by heightened volatility around the time of the independence referendum than 




This paper has made a number of contributions to the existing literature.  First, it has 
identified Scottish companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over a period that 
included the Scottish independence referendum and constructed a capitalisation 
weighted Scottish stock price index. Second, it has investigated the volatility of stock 
returns of Scottish companies listed on the London Stock Exchange as compared to the 
volatility of daily returns using the FTSE all share index around the time of the 
independence referendum. The estimated models were shown to provide a good 
description of time varying conditional volatility over the sample period. Third, through 
exploring how the volatility of stock returns evolves in the run up to and after the 
referendum, this paper contributes to the wider literature on the impacts of political 
uncertainty outside ‘normal’ election cycles. 
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Key findings are firstly that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
conditional volatility of FTSE and Scottish (ex. RBS) stock returns can be characterised 
by the same GARCH parameters up to a sample period ending in late 2013; and second, 
that as the referendum date approaches this result is overturned, with the strength of the 
rejection increasing for the last 5 months prior to the referendum. Together these results 
suggest that while the volatilities of Scottish and FTSE all share indicies have similar 
characteristics up to late 2013, there is evidence of significant divergence in the later 
part of the sample.  A closer look reveals that in the run-up to the independence 
referendum, the relative volatility of Scottish stock returns increased, reaching a peak 
after 7th September when the polls suggested the referendum race was too close to call. 
The volatility of Scottish stock returns then fell immediately after the referendum result 
but climbed again in the run up to the release of the Smith Commission report which 
provided information on proposed “extensive new powers” for the Scottish Parliament. 
The reaction of financial markets at this time demonstrates that the referendum did not 
entirely resolve the uncertainty that both companies and investors faced with respect to 
future policy. 
 
We have shown that these key results are robust to inclusion/exclusion of RBS; 
of companies in the Oil & Gas sector; and of all companies in the Financial Services 
sector. We have also presented some tentative evidence that once the three Scottish 
companies with highest market capitalisation are excluded, the post referendum decline 
in stock market volatility is more muted, with the volatility of the remaining companies’ 
stock returns reaching a (local) peak on at the time of the publication of the Smith 
Commission report.  Further exploration of possible differential impacts of referendum 
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